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Herr
/ Are
Farmers Home Administration's Farm Loan Programs Redundant?
Buzby,
Kenkl, Skees, Pease. and Benson / A
Comparison of Subjective and Historical Yield Distributions with Implications
for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance
LaDue
/ Deferred
Taxes: Estimation Errors and Effects on Analytical Ratios
Splett,
Barry, Dixon, and Ellineger / A
Joint Experience and Statistical Approach to Credit Scoring
Novak
and LaDue / An
Analysis of Multiperiod Agricultural Credit Evaluation Models for New
York Dairy Farms
Miller,
Barry, DeVuyst, Lins, and Sherrick / Farmer
Mac Credit Risk and Capital Adequacy
Perry,
Nixon, and Stoff / Sales
and Excise Taxes: Differential State Subsidies to Production Agriculture
Oltmans
/ Aggregate
Loan Quality Assessment in the Search for a Related Credit-Scoring Model
Ahrendsen,
Collender, and Dixon / An
Empirical Analysis of Optimal Farm Capital Structure Decisions
Sherrick
and Lubben / Economic
Motivations for Vendor Farming
Abstracts
Herr
/ Are
Farmers Home Administration's Farm Loan Programs Redundant? <top>
Rationales
for government-sponsored farm credit programs are presented. The
farm credit market and farm sector are examined to determine the extent
to which present conditions require direct government lending to the
farm sector. It is concluded that conditions in the farm sector
and in the market supplying credit to farmers are dramatically different
from those existing when the Farmers Home Administration was created. It is time to let the program expire or radically change the parameter
of the program. A number of operational issues impacting the agency's
cost effectiveness are identified and discussed.
Buzby,
Kenkl, Skees, Pease. and Benson / A
Comparison of Subjective and Historical Yield Distributions with Implications
for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance <top>
This study
examines whether the discrepancies between subjective yield distributions
elicited from Kentucky farmers in early 1987 and 1989 and the producers'
historical yield distributions explain a general lack of acceptance
of Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI). Results show a correspondence
between the elicited subjective means and the historical averages, although
produces tend to slightly overestimate their expected yields. The results also show a marked difference in skewness, suggesting that
farmers underestimate downside risk. The 1988 drought year appeared
to have little impact on the subjective yield expectations. Based
on their yield expectations, most producers would perceive the historically
based MPCI premium as being overpriced by 36% to 41%.
LaDue
/ Deferred
Taxes: Estimation Errors and Effects on Analytical Ratios <top>
Inclusion
of deferred taxes on market-value balance sheets reduced net worth 33%
for a sample of dairy farms, indicating that solvency standards need
be significantly modified when such balance sheets are used. Reasonable
estimations of deferred taxes can be made by incorporating the resistance
exemption and maximum capital gains tax rate with basic federal and
state tax returns. Most of the other characteristics of the tax
code have a modest effect on estimates. Average tax rates of approximately
25%, 30%, and 35% were found for farms with deferred taxable income
of under $100,000, $100,000 to $400,000, and over $400,000 respectively.
Splett,
Barry, Dixon, and Ellineger / A
Joint Experience and Statistical Approach to Credit Scoring <top>
A joint
experience and statistical approach was utilized to develop credit-scoring
models for the Sixth Farm Credit District. Financial ratios from
the Farm Financial Standards Task Force were determined to be appropriate
explanatory variable measures in the credit-scoring models. Different
structural characteristics of farm businesses were determined to influence
credit-scoring accuracy. Different types of loans required different
credit-scoring models.
Novak
and LaDue / An
Analysis of Multiperiod Agricultural Credit Evaluation Models for New
York Dairy Farms<top>
A creditworthiness
model is developed to overcome the inherent subjectivity of loan default
or bank examiner classification models for credit evaluation. The capital replacement and term debt replacement margin is used as
a measure of borrower creditworthiness. The multi-period models
developed appear to have more stable parameters and provide superior
predictive ability when compared with single-period models.
Miller,
Barry, DeVuyst, Lins, and Sherrick / Farmer
Mac Credit Risk and Capital Adequacy <top>
Data for
formulating the credit risk component of the risk-cased capital stress
test for Farmer Mac were identified and analyzed. Using farm real
estate loan cohorts, defined by year of origination, cumulative loss
rates were determined. Incidences of loan loss were found to be
well below the various forms of reserves and subordinated position requirements
within the Farmer Mac system. A probit regression was estimated
to predict whether or not a Farmer Mac eligible loan would be liquidated. The results indicated that the Farmer Mac underwriting ratio criteria
were statistically significant.
Perry,
Nixon, and Stoff / Sales
and Excise Taxes: Differential State Subsidies to Production Agriculture
<top>
Sales and
exercise taxes are overlooked, but important, tax for farmers. A state-by-state comparison of these taxes is made for commonly purchased
farm inputs. Data from New York dairy farms are used to identify
states that levy high sales and exercise taxes on their farmers
and states that waive a large portion of these taxes.
Oltmans
/ Aggregate
Loan Quality Assessment in the Search for a Related Credit-Scoring Model
<top>
Improving
the assessment and anticipation of changes on loan quality is a continual
challenge to lenders in the management of their loan portfolio. This study shows that the loan quality assessment of a large portfolio
through an aggregate scoring model based on farm-sector financial information
may be feasible. Aggregate models of Production Credit Association
and Federal Land Bank loan quality were developed through ordinary least
squares estimation techniques in a pooled cross-section time series
framework, using loan quality and farm-sector financial information
from the former St. Louis and Louisville Farm Credit Districts. The models quantify a relationship between the quality of farm
loan portfolios and aggregate financial measures. Collateral values,
changes in farmland values, the debt/asset ratio, liquidity, government
payments, and off farm income are significant variables related to the
changes in loan quality. However, the models were unable to uncover
and early warning signals of changes in loan portfolio quality.
Ahrendsen,
Collender, and Dixon / An
Empirical Analysis of Optimal Farm Capital Structure Decisions
<top>
This study
presents empirical tests of the unconstrained, expected utility maximization
model of farm capital structure developed by Collins and by Barry, Baker,
and Sanint. We extend the model to include depreciation, taxes,
investment tax credits, economies of scale, wealth, and a partial-adjustment
specification. Econometric models are specified and estimated
using firm-level data on 110 North Carolina dairy farms from 1976
through 1986. Test results indicate that policies which increase
farmers' profits or decrease farmers' business risk may, in fact, induce
farmers without constrained credit to increase financial risk through
capital structure adjustments, although the adjustment process is likely
slow.
Sherrick
and Lubben / Economic
Motivations for Vendor Farming <top>
Vendor
financing is shown to have advantages over competitive bank financing
in cases where there is some "market power" and positive margins
in the product market; credit can be used to segment demand and extract
additional economic rents; funding, collateral, or security disposition
rates favor the vendor; or there is asymmetric information and
differing abilities to assess credit risk among the variables in the
credit market. Further, the theory predicts that the "optimal"
risk exposure for vendor-financed operations exceeds that of traditional
lenders, even in cases of purely competitive lending environments.
Send
questions and comments to Faye Butts: fsb1@cornell.edu
This
page was last modified on:
04/06/04
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